

POLITICAL RELATIONS, LEADER STABILITY, AND ECONOMIC COERCION:
ONLINE SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX

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PART A: GAME-THEORETIC MODEL OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

This part of the online appendix includes the game-theoretic model that informs our theoretical discussion and Hypotheses 1-4. The set-up of the game, depicted in Figure A1, is common for crisis bargaining models (e.g., Schultz 1999). Like most games of this nature, our model is built on the assumption that there is a policy dispute between the leaders of a sender nation and a target nation.¹ Moreover, we assume that the target nation is practicing an optimal policy, and that some other nation, the sender, would like to see the target change this policy in a way that would make the sender better off. Since the target is pursuing an optimal policy, the target nation's leader will not change the policy unless coerced to do so by the sender. We also restrict the sender's coercive actions to economic sanctions and do not allow the sender to threaten or use other coercive instruments (e.g., military action) either in tandem with sanctions or in isolation.

The starting point in the sanction game is the sender nation's decision to either threaten the target nation with an economic sanction or accept the status quo. If the sender chooses the status quo, the game ends and both nations receive the payoffs associated with having no sanction episode between them. Whenever the game ends in the status quo, either because the sender chooses not to threaten or backs down from a threat, the target leader survives, i.e., remains in office, with probability $(1 - \theta_N)$, where θ_N is the baseline probability of failure determined by Nature. However, if the game ends in an outcome where the status quo changes for the target, either because the target leader offers a concession to the sender or a sanction is imposed, we assume that this deviation from the status quo causes the incumbent leader's probability of failure to increase. We understand that sanctions could in some cases have a rallying effect (e.g. in Galtung 1967), but it is our assumption that, more often than not, sanctions come at a real cost for the leader and her constituencies, and as consequence, the target leader becomes weaker domestically. We believe that this is a justifiable assumption since it has been supported by empirical evidence (Marinov 2005).² Moreover, if the assumption is not true, the empirical hypotheses reported in the article should not hold.

Therefore, under any outcome of the game, the target leader's support base removes the leader with probability θ ($0 \leq \theta \leq 1$), and θ varies throughout the course of the sanction game, such that θ_N is the baseline probability of failure determined by all relevant considerations; θ_{ACQ} is the probability of failure that incorporates the change in θ associated with the outcome of ACQ; θ_{CD} for the outcome of CD; and θ_{DL} if the outcome is DL. We also assume that these probabilities are

¹ We refer to the sender country's leader as "she," and the target country's leader as "he."

² This destabilizing effect is also found in the first stage of our empirical analysis.

known to each player. We do not make any assumptions regarding the relative sizes of the non-status quo probabilities in order to keep our model as general as possible and to incorporate all possible effects of sanction interactions on target leaders' survival.

When the target leader remains in office, he receives a payoff of $(1-\theta_N)r$, where $r > 0$ represents rents from remaining in office (e.g., status, prestige, access to resources or ability to implement preferred policies), and $1-\theta_N$ is the probability that the incumbent stays in office. The sender's payoff is $v(\Pi_i, \theta_k) - p_S$, where $p_S > 0$ represents the policy cost for the sender: the target's current policy must impose a cost on the sender, or there would be no dispute between the two countries. The second part of the sender's payoff, $v(\Pi_i, \theta_k)$, represents the sender's utility from its relations with the target country leadership. $\Pi_i \in [-1, 1]$, where $i = \{I, C\}$, denotes the level of affinity between the preferences of the sender and the target government: under the incumbent target leader (Π_I) or under the target leader's potential replacement (Π_C). We assume that the sender's utility from these relations is equal to $v(\Pi_i, \theta_k)$, where $k = \{N, ACQ, CD, DL\}$ denotes the outcomes of the game with different probabilities of the incumbent target leader survival, i.e., the status quo (as well as the outcome when the sender backs down after a threat), acquiescence after a threat, concessions after sanctions imposition and deadlock.

We further make the assumption that the new leader that replaces the incumbent in the target country is drawn from a known distribution of political challengers with the mean of Π_C , and this distribution is dyad specific. We make this assumption to account for the fact that for certain dyads, it may be more likely that a potential replacement will be more (or less) aligned with the sender leader than the incumbent target leader. Since Π_C is the mean of the distribution, this implies that if the current level of affinity Π_I is greater than Π_C , the sender leader's expectation is that a potential replacement for the target leader will not make her better off, and vice versa, if $\Pi_I < \Pi_C$. Using this convenience, we define dyadic pairs as "friends" when $\Pi_I \geq \Pi_C$, and as "enemies" when $\Pi_I < \Pi_C$. Finally, $v(\Pi_i, \theta_k)$ is a twice-continuously differentiable function with an inflection point at Π_C : for $\Pi_I \geq \Pi_C$, the function is concave such that $v' < 0$ and $v'' < 0$; and for $\Pi_I < \Pi_C$, the function is convex such that $v' > 0$ and $v'' > 0$. Therefore, when the sender deals with a "friendly" target leader, the sender is risk averse, or formally $v(\Pi_i, \theta_k) > \theta_k v(\Pi_C) + (1 - \theta_k)v(\Pi_I)$. When, on the other hand, the sender faces an "enemy," the sender is risk accepting, i.e., $v(\Pi_i, \theta_k) < \theta_k v(\Pi_C) + (1 - \theta_k)v(\Pi_I)$. This suggests that the sender essentially faces a lottery where it can get one of two possible leaders in the target country, and following existing studies (e.g., Bennett and Stam 2003; Goemans and Fey 2009; Croco 2011), we expect country leaders to be willing to play this lottery rather than accept the expected value of the lottery as a certain outcome for undesirable outcomes, but reluctant to play the lottery for desirable outcomes. In the sanction interaction, then, the sender should be more willing to play the lottery when the incumbent is an adversary and more reluctant when the incumbent is a friend. While we seek to remain agnostic about the exact function that produces $v(\Pi_i, \theta_k)$, we use an example function to ease interpretation. Thus, along with stating the equilibria generally, we provide the equilibria when $v(\Pi_i, \theta_k) = (\Pi_C - \Pi_I) (\theta_k^2)$ and $\Pi_C = 0$.

If the sender issues a threat, the target's leader must then decide to either resist (rs) or concede ($\sim rs$). If the target chooses to concede, the policy is forfeited, and the target incurs the cost associated with not pursuing its optimal policy (p_T). In addition to this policy cost, the acquiescence outcome delivers the target a payoff of r multiplied by the probability of staying in office after acquiescing to the sender's demand ($1-\theta_{ACQ}$). From the perspective of the sender's leader, she wins in the dispute over the target's controversial policy. Therefore, she does not incur the policy cost any longer, and her payoff is just the utility she derives from the relationship with the target leadership: $v(\Pi_i, \theta_{ACQ})$.

If the target resists after a threat, the sender leader must determine whether she will follow through and impose sanctions (s), or back down ($\sim s$) from her threat. If the sender backs down, the game ends in the BD outcome. The sender receives the utility derived from the relationship with the target country leadership minus the policy cost and an audience cost ($a \geq 0$) for not backing up her threat: $v(\Pi_i, \theta_N) - p_S - a$. Since there is no change from the status quo for the target, he receives the SQ payoff of r whenever he remains in office. If the sanctions are imposed, the game reaches the final decision node where the target must decide if he will concede the policy after sanctions are imposed ($\sim sf$) or will hold out and create deadlock (sf). If the target concedes (the CD outcome), the sender receives the payoff of $v(\Pi_i, \theta_{CD}) - S_S^L$. S_S^L is the economic cost to the sender nation associated with sanction implementation. If the target concedes, the target's payoff is similar to that of the outcome of pre-sanction concessions, except that the target incurs economic costs as a result of sanctions and experiences a new probability of leadership change: $(1-\theta_{CD})r - p_T - S_T^L$.

In the case of the deadlock outcome, the leaders' payoffs change in the following manner. First, the sender now suffers the policy cost ($-p_S$). The target leader's probability of failure changes to θ_{DL} . Finally, both the sender and target anticipate higher economic costs (S_S^H and S_T^H , respectively) as deadlock implies a longer time horizon for economic sanctions, i.e., we assume that for the sender, $S_S^H > S_S^L > 0$, and for the target, $S_T^H > S_T^L > 0$. Based on this discussion, Figure A2 illustrates the complete sequence of the players' choices with assigned payoffs.

Decision Rules for the Game

*Note: Top-row rules are for general conditions; bottom-row rules are based on the assumptions that $v(\Pi_i, \theta_k) = (\Pi_C - \Pi_I) (\theta_k^2)$ and $\Pi_C = 0$:

Decision Rule 1:

If the sender sanctions, the target stands firm iff

$$\theta_{DL} - \theta_{CD} \geq \frac{S_T^H - S_T^L - p_T}{r}$$

Decision Rule 2:

If the target will stand firm, then the sender sanctions iff

$$v(\Pi_i, \theta_{DL}) - v(\Pi_i, \theta_N) \geq S_S^H - a$$

$$(-\Pi_I)(\theta_N + \theta_{DL}) \geq S_S^H - a$$

Decision Rule 3:

If the target will not stand firm, then the sender sanctions iff

$$v(\Pi_i, \theta_{CD}) - v(\Pi_i, \theta_N) \geq S_S^L - a - p_S$$

$$(-\Pi_I)(\theta_N + \theta_{CD}) \geq S_S^L - a - p_S$$

Decision Rule 4:

If the target will stand firm and the sender will sanction, the target resists iff

$$\theta_{DL} - \theta_{ACQ} \geq \frac{S_T^H - p_T}{r}$$

Decision Rule 5:

If the target will not stand firm and the sender will sanction, the target resists iff

$$\theta_{CD} - \theta_{ACQ} \geq \frac{S_T^L}{r}$$

Decision Rule 6:

If the sender will not sanction, the target resists iff

$$\theta_N - \theta_{ACQ} \geq -\frac{p_T}{r}$$

Since $p_T > 0$ and $r > 0$, the right-hand side is always less than zero. Moreover, since $\theta_N > \theta_{ACQ}$, the left-hand side will always be greater than zero. Thus, the target always resists when the sender will not sanction.

Decision Rule 7:

If target will resist, the sender will sanction and the target will stand firm, the sender threatens iff

$$v(\Pi_i, \theta_{DL}) - v(\Pi_i, \theta_N) \geq S_S^H$$

$$(-\Pi_I)(\theta_N + \theta_{DL}) \geq S_S^H$$

Decision Rule 8:

If the target will resist, the sender will sanction and the target will not stand firm, the sender threatens iff

$$v(\Pi_i, \theta_{CD}) - v(\Pi_i, \theta_N) \geq S_S^L - p_S$$

$$(-\Pi_I)(\theta_N + \theta_{CD}) \geq S_S^L - p_S$$

Decision Rule 9:

If the target will resist and the sender will not sanction, the sender threatens iff

$$a \leq 0$$

Since audience costs can never be negative, the sender would only threaten if there are no audience costs, i.e. $a = 0$.

Decision Rule 10:

If the target will not resist, the sender threatens iff

$$v(\Pi_i, \theta_{ACQ}) - v(\Pi_i, \theta_N) \geq -p_S$$

$$(-\Pi_I)(\theta_N + \theta_{ACQ}) \geq S_S^L - p_S$$

Equilibria

There exist 12 equilibria (there are values of the parameters that make all four decisions rule hold)³:

- TH, RS, ~SF, DL (only true if $a=0$ and indifferent between SF and ~SF) [Outcome: Sender Backs Down]
- TH, RS, ~SF, CD (only true if $a=0$ and indifferent between SF and ~SF) [Outcome: Sender Backs Down]
- TH, RS, SF, DL [Outcome: Deadlock after Sanction]
- TH, RS, SF, CD [Outcome: Concession after Sanction]
- TH, ~RS, SF, DL [Outcome: Target acquiesces to Threat]
- TH, ~RS, SF, CD [Outcome: Target acquiesces to Threat]
- ~TH, RS, ~SF, DL [Outcome: Status Quo]
- ~TH, RS, ~SF, CD [Outcome: Status Quo]
- ~TH, ~RS, SF, DL [Outcome: Status Quo]
- ~TH, ~RS, SF, CD [Outcome: Status Quo]
- ~TH, RS, SF, DL [Outcome: Status Quo]
- ~TH, RS, SF, CD [Outcome: Status Quo]

³ We assume that an actor can make either choice when indifferent.

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Figure A1: Extensive Sanction Game with General Payoffs





Figure A2: Extensive Sanction Game with Specific Payoffs



PART B: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

This part of the online appendix describes our data and variables and includes goodness-of-fit statistics and robustness checks. These additional models show that:

- our results remain unaffected when we use alternative approaches to modeling temporal dynamics
- the results are robust to estimation with lagged affinity measures
- the results from the threat stage do not change if we estimate the model using rare events logit on the full sample.

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First Stage Data and Variables

The rationale for including most of the variables in the first stage model is that existing studies identify two crucial factors for leader survival: economic conditions and whether or not the nation is involved in a costly conflict. Time dependence is captured in logged tenure and cubic splines for years without failure. Tenure is interacted with a *Democracy* dummy (Polity score > 6) because previous research has found that the autocrat's hazard decreases through time while the democratic leader's increases.⁴

For the coding of *Ongoing Imposed Sanction*, we use the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi 2014).⁵ *Ongoing Imposed Sanction* takes the value of one if the target experienced ongoing sanctions, and zero otherwise. The *Militarized Dispute* variable is constructed in a similar fashion: it equals one if the

⁴ Source: Polity IV Dataset (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2013).

⁵ In this way, our model deviates from Marinov's analysis as he used the Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (1990) dataset for his analysis. At the time of his paper's publication, the TIES dataset did not exist. However, the TIES dataset is much richer as it contains a far greater number of cases, particularly more low-profile sanctions. Thus, our model is a much stronger test of whether sanctions destabilize because it does not just consider highly salient sanction cases.

Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004) indicates that the target country was involved in a dispute during that year. Measures of *Logged GDP per Capita*, *Logged Population* and *GDP Growth* were constructed using data from the Penn World Tables.⁶ *Leader's Age*, *Previous Times in Office* (a count of the number of previous times in office), and *Irregular Means of Entry* were taken from the Archigos dataset.⁷ *Irregular Means of Entry* is a binary variable, which takes the value of one if the leader gained political office through non-legitimate means (such as coup or imposition by a foreign state) and zero if the leader gained office through a legitimate process (line of succession, election, etc.). The variable *Civil War* indicates whether the target country experienced a civil war in that year. We used the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 1945-2012 to determine whether intrastate conflict took place in the target nation.⁸ Table B1 presents summary statistics of all these variables.

Table B1: Summary Statistics for Variables in First Stage Models

Variable	Mean/Mode	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Ongoing Sanction	0	0.41	0	1
Militarized Dispute	0	0.04	0	1
Logged GDP per Capita	7.54	1.36	3.87	10.90
Logged Population	8.67	1.88	2.81	14.07
GDP Growth	0.08	0.11	-0.68	4.12
Civil War	0	0.27	0	1
Democracy	0	0.47	0	1
Leader's Age	56.62	11.54	17	92
Logged Leader Tenure	7.42	1.06	1.79	9.74
Previous Times in Office	0	0.45	0	4
Irregular Entry	0	0.43	0	1
Years since Failure (T)	7.01	7.51	0	46

***Failure Occurrence: 1,122 (15.57%), summary statistics based on sample of leaders**

⁶ For the measure of GDP, we used Total Purchased Power Parity Converted GDP, at current prices, using the Geary-Khamis Method and International Dollars.

⁷ The Archigos dataset has instances where there are multiple leaders in a year. When this occurred, we used the values for the leader in office when the year began.

⁸ The PRIO dataset include cases of war where one side is a government actor and there are at least 25 battle deaths. The dataset includes both external and internal wars, so we only included internal wars and used the location variable to ascertain whether the war was taking place within the country. The PRIO dataset was used over the COW Intrastate dataset for precisely this reason. The PRIO dataset specifically states where the war took place, while COW only identifies the region (e.g. Asia).

Second Stage Data and Variables

We construct a list of control variables for the threat model by reviewing factors that can influence the probability that any two states would enter into a dispute in the first place. States are more likely to have a dispute when they have more interactions. The logic is straightforward: frequent interactions are likely to create reasons and opportunities for conflict, and hence, the likelihood of disputes increases. Interactions depend on geographical proximity, so states that are closer together geographically should be more likely to have a dispute. The variable *Logged Distance*, which is the logged distance (in miles) between the two states' capitals (Bennett and Stam 2000), controls for the influence of proximity. Greater economic interdependence should also increase interactions as well as provide greater opportunities to impose costs through economic coercion. To that end, dyadic levels of trade, *Logged Dyadic Trade*, were taken from the Correlates of War International Trade Dataset (Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins 2009).

Wealthier senders should be more likely to enter a dispute for several reasons. They are more likely to have diversified trade portfolios giving these states more opportunities to come into conflict with others over trade issues.⁹ The monitoring and enforcement of sanctions can be quite costly, which should prevent poorer states from initiating sanction episodes. Furthermore, wealthier states are better able to give economic aid that they can cut if they enter a dispute with a recipient of such assistance. Due to these considerations, we include *Logged Sender GDP* (again from the Penn World Tables) into the model. Moreover, those targets with larger economic networks have more opportunities to become sanctioned as they provide more states with means to cause economic harm as well as increase the propensity for economic disputes. Therefore, we include *Logged Target GDP* (Penn World Tables) in the model. Those states who are currently experiencing militarized conflict might also have cause for economic warfare so we include our *Militarized Interstate Dispute* variable in the threat model as well (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). We also add another regressor—*Logged Capability Ratio*—to account for the effect that military balance may have on the sender's decision.¹⁰

⁹ A similar argument can be made for a greater propensity of wealthier states to become targets of sanctions. Moreover, the joint wealth of states is a key variable in the gravity model of trade, so wealthier states should be more likely to trade and thus more likely to use trade links as bargaining leverage. A robustness check with *Joint GDP* shows that the inclusion of this variable does not influence our main results. These models are included below.

¹⁰ The data are from EUGene, version 3.204.

Existing sanctions research suggests that democracies are more likely to be targeted because they should find it more difficult to resist after sanction imposition and, hence, should be more willing to concede to senders' demands. This unwillingness to resist is due to public pressure arising from the costs of sanctions; this pressure makes democratic governments less capable of withstanding the economic turmoil associated with sanctions (Allen 2008a, b). The variable *Target Democracy* is coded as 1 if the target state has a Polity IV score of 7 or greater, and 0 otherwise. The threat model includes a control for *Sender Democracy* to account for effects that differences in senders' regime types may have on the propensity to resort to sanctions. Finally, we take into account time effects by including a variable for the occurrence of the *Cold War* (1947-1991) and employing a count of years without a sanction episode, as well as natural cubic splines (Beck, Katz and Tucker 2008).¹¹

The sanction model includes several of the control variables from the threat models, but we drop all variables that measure the level of economic activity (*Logged Sender GDP*, *Logged Target GDP*, and *Logged Dyadic Trade*) because these variables were included in the threat stage to capture the general propensity to get into a dispute. After we have accounted for these determinants of sanction episode initiation, they are no longer necessary. However, the potential costs and success of sanctions become vital for the decision to implement sanctions; therefore, we retain the target democracy. We also include two more variables to account for the costs of sanction imposition: *Target's Trade Dependence* and *Sender's Trade Dependence*.

According to our theoretical model, sanction threats should be more prevalent when they are most likely to work. This usually means that the sender state can impose greater costs because the target is more dependent on its trade relationship with the sender. To capture this economic leverage, we code the variable *Target's Trade Dependence*, which is the total annual amount of trade between the sender and target divided by the target's total monadic trade in that year. Both measures of dyadic and monadic trade were taken from the *Correlates of War International Trade Dataset* (Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins 2009).¹² At the same time, senders should be less inclined to initiate sanction episodes that will be more damaging to their own

¹¹ Results are robust to inclusion of other time variables including trend and modeling technique suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010). Results are provided below.

¹² This dataset appears to have some coding errors because for approximately 200 observations dyadic trade values exceed monadic values. Since this is obviously a mistake, we replaced the monadic values for these observations with the sum of all dyadic values.

economies; therefore, we also include *Sender's Trade Dependence*, which is the total annual amount of sender-target trade divided by the sender's total monadic trade in that year.

Moreover, democratic senders may find it harder to back down due to audience costs, so the sender democracy dummy is in this model as well. Monitoring and enforcement of imposed sanctions become costlier with distance; consequently, logged distance remains in the model to capture any effects of geographical proximity on the sanction decision. Finally, since the sanction model only considers cases, in which there has been a prior threat, the resulting sample is based on cross-section data and, hence, we do not include splines or peace years to capture temporal dependence. Table B2 presents summary statistics of all variables.

Table B2: Summary Statistics for Variables in Second Stage Models
(Politically Relevant Dyads)

Variable	Mean/Mode	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Predicted Failure	0.16	0.16	0.00007	0.9997
Ideal Point Deviation	-0.0003	0.61	-2.72	3.26
Sender Democracy	0	0.50	0	1
Target Democracy	0	0.50	0	1
Logged Sender GDP	18.01	2.75	9.53	23.18
Logged Target GDP	18.02	2.75	9.53	23.18
Sender's Trade Dependence	0.04	0.09	0	1
Target's Trade Dependence	0.04	0.09	0	1
Logged Dyadic Trade	3.31	4.11	-6.91	13.09
Logged Distance	3.95	8.14	-11.51	9.39
Logged Capability Ratio	-0.02	4.54	-11.51	12.12
Cold War	1	0.49	0	1
Militarized Interstate Dispute	0	0.11	0	1
Peace Years	22.78	16.41	0	60

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Table B3: Results for Logit Models of Target Leader Failure

	Natural Cubic Splines	Natural cubic splines and Years without Leader Failure	Cubic polynomial approximation (Carter and Signorino 2010)
Ongoing Sanction	0.22** (0.10)	0.20** (0.10)	0.20* (0.10)
Militarized Dispute	-0.15* (0.09)	-0.16* (0.09)	-0.16* (0.09)
Logged GDP per Capita	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Logged Population	0.05* (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
GDP Growth	-1.19** (0.49)	-1.14** (0.49)	-1.10** (0.48)
Civil War	0.55** (0.14)	0.56** (0.14)	0.52** (0.13)
Democracy	-1.14 (0.70)	-1.59** (0.71)	-2.35** (0.65)
Leader's Age	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Logged Leader Tenure	-2.19** (0.11)	-2.86** (0.16)	-2.57** (0.17)
Democracy*Logged Tenure	0.29** (0.10)	0.35** (0.10)	0.45** (0.09)
Previous Times in Office	0.13 (0.08)	0.17** (0.08)	0.19** (0.08)
Irregular Means of Entry	0.24** (0.11)	0.16 (0.12)	0.15 (0.11)
Cubic Spline 1	-0.17** (0.01)	-0.18** (0.01)	
Cubic Spline 2	0.09** (0.01)	0.09** (0.01)	
Cubic Spline 3	-0.03** (0.002)	-0.03** (0.002)	
t		0.22** (0.03)	0.67** (0.07)
t^2			-0.03** (0.004)
t^3			0.0004** (0.0001)
Constant	11.33** (0.81)	15.37** (1.04)	13.54** (1.10)
Observations	6138	6138	6138
Log likelihood	-2041.54	-2021.66	-2131.21
Proportional Reduction in Error	17.70%	19.4%	14.7%

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, two-tailed tests

Table B4: Goodness of Fit Statistics for Failure Models

Pseudo R²

	Logit Splines	Logit Cubic Approximation	Probit Splines	Probit Cubic Approximation
Cox-Snell's R ²	0.154	0.124	0.152	0.121
Adjusted Count R ²	0.194	0.147	0.186	0.147
Adjusted McFadden's R ²	0.196	0.153	0.192	0.150
McFadden's R ²	0.203	0.159	0.199	0.156
Efron's R ²	0.224	0.177	0.220	0.174
Cragg-Uhler's R ²	0.274	0.219	0.270	0.216
McKelvey & Zavoina's R ²	0.328	0.257	0.309	0.244
Average of R ² Measures	0.225	0.177	0.218	0.173

Confusion Matrix

	Logit Splines	Logit Cubic Approximation	Probit Splines	Probit Cubic Approximation
Accuracy (Correctly Classified)	88.35%	87.67%	88.24%	87.67%
Specificity (True Negative Rate)	99.35%	99.60%	99.45%	99.70%
Sensitivity (True Positive Rate)	23.22%	17.02%	21.87%	16.46%
Positive Predictive Value (Precision)	85.83%	87.79%	87.00%	90.12%
Negative Predictive Value	88.45%	87.66%	88.28%	87.60%

Proportional Reduction in Error

	Logit Splines	Logit Cubic Approximation	Probit Splines	Probit Cubic Approximation
Modal Prediction Accuracy for ~Failure	85.55%	85.55%	85.55%	85.55%
Modal Prediction Accuracy for Failure	0%	0%	0%	0%
Model's Accuracy for ~Failure	99.35%	99.60%	99.44%	99.70%
Model's Accuracy for Failure	23.22%	17.02%	21.87%	16.46%
Proportional Reduction in Error	19.39%	14.66%	18.60%	14.66%

Table B5: Goodness of Fit Statistics for Sanction Models

Pseudo R²

Cox-Snell's R ²	0.107
Adjusted Count R ²	0.198
Adjusted McFadden's R ²	0.047
McFadden's R ²	0.082
Efron's R ²	0.105
Cragg-Uhler's R ²	0.143
McKelvey & Zavoina's R ²	0.161
Average of R ² Measures	0.120

Confusion Matrix

Accuracy (Correctly Classified)	63.67%
Specificity (True Negative Rate)	52.86%
Sensitivity (True Positive Rate)	72.63%
Positive Predictive Value (Precision)	65.03%
Negative Predictive Value	61.54%

Proportional Reduction in Error

Modal Prediction Accuracy for ~Sanction	0%
Modal Prediction Accuracy for Sanction	61.07%
Model's Accuracy for ~Sanction	52.86%
Model's Accuracy for Sanction	72.63%
Proportional Reduction in Error	19.82%

Table B6: Results for Survival Models of Target Leader Failure

	Cox	Cox (2)	Weibull	Weibull (2)
Ongoing Sanction	0.17** (0.08)	0.19** (0.08)	0.18** (0.08)	0.20** (0.08)
Militarized Dispute	-0.003 (0.07)	-0.005 (0.07)	-0.005 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)
Logged GDP per Capita	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Logged Population	0.08** (0.02)	0.09** (0.02)	0.08** (0.02)	0.10** (0.02)
GDP Growth	-1.08** (0.41)	-1.11** (0.41)	-1.11** (0.41)	-1.13** (0.41)
Civil War	0.51** (0.11)	0.50** (0.11)	0.51** (0.11)	0.50** (0.11)
Democracy	1.48** (0.09)	-1.80** (0.41)	1.54** (0.09)	-1.70** (0.41)
Leader's Age	-0.03** (0.003)	-0.04** (0.003)	-0.04** (0.003)	-0.04** (0.003)
Previous Times in Office	0.46** (0.06)	0.50** (0.06)	0.47** (0.06)	0.51** (0.06)
Irregular Means of Entry	0.11 (0.09)	0.12 (0.10)	0.09 (0.09)	0.11 (0.09)
Democracy*Logged Tenure		0.49** (0.06)		
Ln(p)				
Constant			-0.11** (0.03)	-0.31** (0.04)
Democracy				0.45** (0.05)
Observations	6430	6430	6430	6430
Log likelihood	-7024.77	-6991.01	-3331.89	-3298.67
Wald chi2	520.95	588.47	593.24	271.53
Non-Proportional Hazard Test	48.53**			

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, two-tailed tests

Table B7: Threat Models with Cubic Approximation, Lagged S-score and Rare Events Logit

	Cubic Approximation	Lagged Affinity	Rare Events Logit
Predicted Leader Failure	-0.29 (0.36)	-0.20 (0.32)	0.05 (0.33)
Ideal Point Deviation	-0.02 (0.14)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.16 (0.14)
Ideal Point Deviation*Predicted Leader Failure	-1.25** (0.53)	-0.92* (0.47)	-1.04* (0.58)
Democratic Sender	0.47** (0.16)	0.45** (0.17)	0.17 (0.12)
Democratic Target	-0.22 (0.14)	-0.23 (0.15)	-0.21* (0.11)
Logged Sender GDP	0.27** (0.10)	0.27** (0.10)	0.68** (0.07)
Logged Target GDP	0.26** (0.10)	0.25** (0.11)	0.25** (0.08)
Logged Dyadic Trade	0.14** (0.05)	0.15** (0.06)	0.28** (0.04)
Logged Distance	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Logged Capability Ratio	0.11 (0.08)	0.10 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.07)
MID Initiation	1.23** (0.31)	1.22** (0.35)	1.72** (0.29)
Cold War	0.41** (0.13)	0.39** (0.12)	0.57** (0.09)
Peace Years	-0.32** (0.03)	-0.38** (0.04)	
Peace Years^2	0.01** (0.001)		
Peace Years^3	-0.0001** (0.0002)		
Cubic Spline 1		-0.003** (0.0005)	
Cubic Spline 2		0.002** (0.0004)	
Cubic Spline 3		-0.0004** (0.0001)	
Constant	-14.13** (1.56)	-13.87** (1.54)	-25.48** (1.41)
Observations	66793	66204	653855
Log likelihood	-2131.32	-2089.26	

Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.

100 replications. Stratified by sender.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, two-tailed tests

PART C: CASE STUDIES

This part of the online appendix provides information for four additional case studies that could not be included in the article. The article reports the two U.S.-Chile cases marked with asterisks. The table below places all six case studies in quadrants of our theoretical two-by-two table. All but one of these case studies rely on primary sources, including declassified transcripts and audio recordings of White House discussions, diplomatic cables, and internal memoranda made available through the Miller Center, the National Security Archive, presidential libraries and the *Foreign Relations of the United States* reference material.

Our qualitative research provides evidence of senders’ concern about destabilizing friends or taking on strong adversaries. As we show below, such concerns can be sufficient to prevented even sanction threats. Therefore, we include cases in which the status quo has prevailed.

Overview of Case Studies

	“Friends”	“Adversaries”
Stable	France-New Zealand [Sanction]	U.S.-Dominican Republic [Delayed Sanction until Unstable] U.S.-Haiti [No Threat]
Unstable	*U.S.-Chile 1974 [No Sanction] U.S.-Chile 1965 [No Threat]	*U.S.-Chile 1970-73 [Sanction]

US-Dominican Republic 1960-1961 (“Stable Adversary”)

Rafael Trujillo, the leader of the Dominican Republic from 1930 to 1961, was arguably the most brutal and vicious dictator in Latin American history. For the first three decades of his rule, the United States government believed that it was in its best interest to support the dictator. Although the United States was never enthusiastic about supporting such a repressive regime, it did so for strategic reasons: the need for stability in a geographically proximate state, the presence of a guided missile tracking station on the island, Trujillo’s usual support in key international organizations, and his staunch assurances that his regime would be anti-communist (US Dept. of State 1960; Hall 2000; Slater 1964, 269).

However, there was a gradual softening of support. In particular, the United States became more uncomfortable with Trujillo’s killings of dissidents (US Dept. of State 1960). In

addition, Trujillo was only valuable as long as he remained stable, but starting in 1959, he finally appeared vulnerable for the first time (Hall 2000; Slater 1964). A foiled assassination plot in early 1959, along with the growing emergence of a domestic opposition and economic and budget woes, made the US feel that “the dictator’s days [were] numbered” (Slater 1964, 271-272). The tipping point was the revelation that Trujillo was personally involved in the assassination attempt on Venezuelan president Rómulo Betancourt in 1960.

That same year, the Dominican Republic was in line to receive a major windfall from the Cuban embargo. In particular, Dominican sugar exports to the United States were expected to increase dramatically: a projected rise in export values of nearly \$30 million (Hall 2000, 97). President Eisenhower urged for Trujillo’s removal, sensing that the strongman was damaging US relations with Latin America, and sought to prevent Trujillo from reaping the benefits of the sugar windfall. However, Trujillo’s support was still too strong to risk the political capital associated with such a maneuver (several Southern Congressman opposed such action). On September 26th, Eisenhower eventually decided to let the 1960 quota system go through and allow Trujillo his windfall (111).

When President Kennedy entered office in 1961, one of his first tasks was to reexamine relations and become tougher on Trujillo. After reading cables from the Dominican Republican Consulate that “an ambush of Trujillo [was] considerably more likely than [a] month ago” and that Trujillo was following a “course leading to the destruction of his own regime,” Kennedy decided to investigate whether the elimination of profits from sugar exports to the US would destabilize Trujillo, and if so, the potential of a Castroist regime replacing the dictator. (US Dept. of State 1961a, b).

The investigation suggested that Trujillo was experiencing increased economic and political difficulties. Economically, unemployment and inflation were high, the economy was sluggish and the national budget was in a substantial deficit. Politically, the picture was brighter for Trujillo: there was “no solid evidence that Trujillo’s fall is imminent.” Although the opposition had “substantially increased in numbers in recent years,” they were “unable to move effectively against Trujillo.” As for Communist replacements, there was significant uncertainty since the relative non-existence of an opposition made it unclear who would assume power (US Dept. of State 1961a).

In the end, Kennedy decided Trujillo was unstable enough to risk the removal of sugar profits. He was successful in getting Congress to include a provision allowing the President the discretion to hold back sugar import quotas from a nation with which the United States had no diplomatic relations (the US had severed diplomatic ties with the Dominican Republic after the Betancourt incident). As a result, Kennedy was able to stop an additional 400,000 tons of sugar from being imported from Dominican Republic until June 30, 1962 (Hall 2000, 114). Trujillo was assassinated in 1961.

US-Haiti 1962 (“Stable Adversary”)

In March 1961, newly-elected President John F. Kennedy unrolled his ambitious economic cooperation and development plan for Latin America: The Alliance for Progress. The main goal of this plan was to help develop friendly, democratic and economically stable nations in Latin America that would prevent the establishment of Castroist regimes in other Latin nations and counterbalance Soviet influence in the region. Four years earlier, Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier had been elected the Haiti president, and since his ascension into power he had worked to consolidate power and transform the nation into a personalist dictatorship. Using assurances that he was anti-communist, Duvalier was able to leverage significant amount of economic assistance from the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

By mid-1962, his relationship with the Kennedy administration soured. At the time, the Kennedy administration was providing the Haiti government with economic and military aid. Diplomatic cables began to surface that Duvalier used this aid to build up a 5,000-person militia dedicated to his own protection. The use of Alliance for Progress money to build a dictatorship was a black stain for the program as well as a personal embarrassment for Kennedy.

In August 1962, the Kennedy administration began to have internal discussions of whether actions should be taken to remove Duvalier from power. Executive Secretary of the Department of State William H. Brubeck set out his policy in a memorandum, stating that “Duvalier cannot remain in power for any extended period without United States economic and military assistance, these two levers were being used to bring carefully measured pressure to bear on the regime.”

The memorandum led to a meeting the next day in the Oval Office between State, Defense, CIA officials and President Kennedy. Many of Kennedy’s advisors tried to convince

him that cuts in the aid programs as well as planning CIA subversion activities were necessary and would likely be successful. However, Kennedy was hesitant to believe these claims. He questioned whether aid cuts and CIA operations would be enough to destabilize Duvalier as well as the assumption that Duvalier's likely successors would be better for the United States. In the end, Kennedy chose to wait on plans to destabilize Duvalier until destabilization strategies would work and more suitable replacements came onto the scene. For the time being, aid would continue to flow to Haiti (The Miller Center 1962).

US-Chile 1965-1966 (“Unstable Friend”)

During the first year and a half of his administration, President Lyndon B. Johnson saw the price of copper increase from 31¢ to 36¢ per pound. The price hike was troublesome for two reasons. First, the price hike in copper coincided with increases in the price of other primary metals, particularly copper's substitute—aluminum. The result was a 2.5% increase in the wholesale price index. This inflationary pressure concerned Johnson because his popularity was being buoyed by economic prosperity. Second, Johnson had just recently escalated the Vietnam conflict by sending an additional 100,000 Marines and the elevated cost of metals would make this campaign substantially more expensive (Berteau 1982, 173-174; Weintraub 1982, 36-37; The Miller Center 1965c).

However, in late October 1965, the two major American copper companies, Anaconda Mining and Phelps Dodge, raised the price of copper again to 38¢ per pound. In response, President Johnson dispatched Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Special Assistant to the President Joseph Califano to try to influence these companies to drop the price of copper. Yet, executives at these firms stated that they could not convince their boards to “rollback” because the hike was in direct response to the Chilean government's decision to raise the price of Chilean copper (US Dept. of State 1965a,f; The Miller Center 1965a,c).

The Chilean president was Eduardo Frei Montalva, who owed his political power to considerable financial and political support from the United States. During his election in 1964, the United States spent \$2-3 million dollars in CIA programs to ensure that Frei would win a congressional run-off vote over Socialist opponent Salvador Allende. While in office, United

States guaranteed Frei's stability through foreign aid: US AID (Agency for International Development) assistance in 1965 was \$97 million, almost triple the amount in 1963 (176).

At the same time, Frei's domestic support was almost entirely tied to the copper market. In 1965, copper exports made up 75% of Chile's entire export revenue and had long been a major political issue in Chile. During the previous conservative government of Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964), many politicians decried the fact that copper policies were more in line with American interests than Chilean. During campaign, Frei advocated for buying shares in the American copper companies operating in Chile to have controlling stake, and in turn, be able to manipulate prices and increase tax revenues. While in office, Frei made good on his promise and Chile controlled 51% of Kennecott Mining and a quarter of Anaconda by 1967 (Berteau 1982, 174; Hersh 1983, 260-261).

On November 15, 1965, President Johnson sent Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman and Assistant Secretary of State Anthony Solomon to begin negotiations with the Frei government to keep the price of copper low. However, the copper issue put Frei between a rock and a hard place: he did not have the domestic stability to make concessions. United States Ambassador to Chile Dugan relayed to National Security Advisor Bundy that the "carrot-stick combination" would succeed in getting Frei to make concessions but would carry a heavy political price as to "force [the] Frei government to a rollback might very well bring the government down or so weaken it as to make it difficult or impossible to pursue the reform program on which it is embarked." Such an event would have to be avoided since it would be "a suicidal course in terms of American foreign policy" and would have an "inevitable adverse political effect" as the Frei administration represented "the hope of democracy and the Alliance for Progress in Latin America." (US Dept. of State 1965b).

In the end, a negotiated agreement was reached. Johnson agreed to a compromise that would give Frei political cover and ensure his stability by making it look as if Frei responded to market events and not American political pressure (US Dept. of State 1965e). Anaconda and Phelps Dodge agreed to drop their prices first with an understanding that the Chilean government would drop theirs shortly after. Then, US Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara would release 200,000 tons of copper from stockpile to increase supply and lower the price, impose controls on copper exports, have Chile send 100,000 tons of copper to Anaconda at 36¢ per pound and request that New York Commodity Exchange increase margin requirements on

copper futures contracts so the price could stay down. In exchange, the US government would drop the 1.7% import duty on Chilean copper and give a \$10 million US aid loan with generous rates to offset the cost to the Chilean government (Berteau 1982, 182; The Miller Center 1965b).

France-New Zealand 1986 (“Stable Friend”)

On July 10, 1985, the *Rainbow Warrior*, the flagship of the environmental group Greenpeace, exploded and sank in New Zealand’s Auckland Harbor, claiming the life of Dutch photographer Fernando Pereira. The vessel arrived in New Zealand to participate in a protest flotilla that intended to hinder French nuclear weapons testing on the South Pacific atoll of Moruroa. Just two days later, New Zealand authorities arrested Captain Dominique Prieur and Major Alain Mafart, agents of the French spy agency *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure* (DGSE), and charged them with murder, arson and conspiracy. New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange demanded that Captain Prieur and Major Mafart be prosecuted, that the French government apologize and provide compensation to the Pereira family and that France pay \$10 million in damages to New Zealand. France agreed to the apology and compensation to the Pereira family, but negotiations stalled because France refused to pay New Zealand compensation and would not allow their citizens to be held in a New Zealand prison after the pair was sentenced to ten years of incarceration (Thakur 1986; Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg 2007).

During these negotiations, French opposition party leaders, namely Parisian mayor Jacques Chirac, used the *Rainbow Warrior* affair as a campaign issue for the upcoming March elections. At a rally on October 4th, Chirac told his supporters “that the French government will oppose the importation of butter into the community if there is no political accord with New Zealand... The position will be the same concerning mutton” (“Chirac” 1985, 1). This threat was quite credible because European import quotas on butter and mutton were set to be renewed on August 1, 1986 and the vote needed to be unanimous, essentially giving France veto power. These sanctions would be crippling to the New Zealand economy: Europe made up just over 20% of New Zealand’s export market. Moreover, New Zealand heavily relied on British imports for its butter industry (Thakur 1986). When Chirac became prime minister after the March 1986 elections, he continued with these threats.

In addition, France exerted economic pressure on key New Zealand goods (sheep brains, wool, fish, potatoes and butter) through informal means. First, they coerced the French territory of New Caledonia not to accept imports from New Zealand. Then, French custom agents were ordered to delay the granting of import licenses, process New Zealand shipments slowly and return goods as incorrectly labeled. Customs agents also went about destroying New Zealand goods under the guise of inspection (F. Lewis 1986; P. Lewis 1986). Despite continued French economic pressure, Lange pledged to hold firm.

However, by mid-June 1986, with the decision on butter and lamb quotas looming and the hard-liner Chirac now in power, Lange sought out third-party mediation. France and New Zealand asked UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to mediate their dispute, for which he agreed. France, New Zealand and Perez de Cuellar were able to reach an agreement: New Zealand would have the agents exiled on a French military base in the Pacific for three years, while France would pay \$7 million in damages, make a public apology to New Zealand and agree to normalize trade again (Thakur 1986). In France, the agreement was seen as a major diplomatic victory for the newly-formed Chirac government as well as the outgoing Socialists. Lange paid a political price for his concession: polls showed that his public approval fell noticeably after the agents' release ("UN Settlement" 1986). However, he was stable enough to survive the concession and remain prime minister for another three years.

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